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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

APRIL, 1914

WE APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT

TO SAVE MEXICO; TO SAVE HIS PARTY; TO SAVE HIMSELF.

BY THE EDITOR

“The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford to do—a voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere questioned and misunderstood. We ought to reverse our action without raising the question whether we were right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and the redemption of every obligation without quibble or hesitation.”

Those words, Mr. President, spoken by you as the head of the Nation to the Congress of the United States upon the first day of your second year in office were more than worthy, more than courageous; they were noble. They breathed the sense of National honor; they were shot through with patriotic feeling; they evinced the power of personal greatness to acknowledge and repair a fault. And they will serve the purpose for which they were uttered—never fear!

Pending the accomplishment of that great triumph which is to be yours, may we not ask you to perform the more pressing duty of turning your eyes upon the stricken people of bleeding Mexico, and consider—consider in candor and with the deep solicitude which we know you feel—whether

you may not apply those words to them. Is not our attitude toward them also "everywhere questioned and misunderstood"? We think and presently shall try to convince your mind that it is. If we shall succeed in that endeavor, is not "the large thing to do the only thing we can afford to do"—a reversal of our action "without raising the question whether we were right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and the redemption of every obligation without quibble or hesitation"?

Four months have elapsed since we raised the questions—

What legal or moral right has a President of the United States to say who shall or shall not be President of Mexico? and

Did not President Wilson imbed himself in a practically inextricable position when he demanded the retirement of Huerta?

and the only answers forthcoming are to be found in a consensus of the world's opinion and in a hopelessly tangled diplomatic situation surcharged with peril. But no! That is not strictly accurate. You answered the first question, Mr. President, when you recognized the Huerta of Peru, and you answered the second when you urged so impressively upon the Congress, as a primary reason for repudiating a pledge of your own party platform, the necessity of mollifying foreign Powers.

The partisan attacks to which you are now being increasingly subjected constitute, we suspect, the least of your anxieties. Senators and Representatives who demand "action" which would lead to armed intervention may reflect the opinion of their own restricted constituencies, but they wholly misinterpret the wish of the country. Never was a war so unpopular, so hateful in the eyes of the people, as would be a war now with distracted Mexico. Whether avoidance thus far is fairly attributable to your sagacity and forbearance, or to mere good fortune, or to both, matters not at all; the country is grateful, sir, deeply grateful to you for sparing them the calamity which unhappily so many are coming to regard as inevitable.

Nor does one whit of justice lie in the strident criticisms of your course as "inert" and "lifeless." You have done all that lay within your power to do in furtherance of the success of your programme. Never before to our knowledge, while their countries were at peace and resolved to continue in amicable relationship, has one President de-

clared war upon another President. Yet that is what you did without a quiver of hesitation. And you did not stop there. You certainly struck deep and hard in those days early in November when the following declaration was served upon Huerta, as coming from the President of the United States:

Primero: Que el primero magistrado considera que el reciente golpe de estado fue una contravencion directa de la seguridades que el, Huerta, había dado á su gobierno.

Segundo: Que á menos de que el, Huerta, voluntariamente y obrando como por propio inspiracion se retire luego del poder y abandone toda idea de controlar la organizacion del gobierno y el curso de los negocios, el primer magistrado se verá en la necesidad de entreenir en los terminos de un ultimatum que al ser rechazada le obligará á proponer al congreso de su pais que se tomen medidas practicas de la mas seria naturaleza.

Tercero: Que el gobierno del primero magistrado desea sinceramente de evitar las medidas extremas tanto por el bien de Mexico como por el bien de la paz de America, y esta por el mismo dispuesto á hacer algo razonable á fin de no herir los sentimientos de dignidad de Huerta y para darle la proteccion personal que necesitaré.

Cuarto: Que por tal motivo, propone el siguiente curso que se escoja alguno persona ó pequeño groupo de personas que en lo menos posible hayan estado ligados con los recientes perturbaciones politicos (por ejemplo, personas de edad maduro retirados de la politica que goza de le confianza general del publico), al fin de que constituye un gobierno constitucional y hagan los arreglos necesarios para elecciones generales en las que se elijan un nuevo congreso y un nuevo jefe del ejecutivo, para que así el queda establecido sobre una base constitucional.

Quinto: Que hace absolutamente necesario una acción semejante al fin de que merezca la aprobacion del primero magistrado, pues su gobierno esta firme y irrevocablemente resuelto, por un medio ú otro, á cortar de rais toda ayuda el, Huerta, crea encontrar en el extranjero, si es que insiste en su proposito de permanecer en el poder, siendo ademas un hecho que solamente por algunas dias mas podra el, Huerta, tener la libertad de escojer el camino que desea seguir. Su retiro y una libertad absoluto de accion de rehabilitar el poder constitucional será el unico que el primero magistrado acepte. Este gobierno no podra urgir con demasiado vehemencia el que haga su eleccion, ya que es inevitable, con todo sabiduria y en plena consideracion de las terribles consecuencias que traeran su vacilacion ó rehuso.

Sexto: Que el, proposito de substituir á Blanquet ó cualquiera otro representante del gobierno de Huerta y de su golpe de estado conduciera á una irritacion mayor de parte del primero magistrado y la inevitable ruptura definitiva, así como tambien daría el mismo resultado el pretender llevar al poder á los supuestos escogidos en las ultimas elecciones, sea para presidente ó miembro del congreso.

Or, as re-translated:

First: That the first magistrate is of the opinion that the recent *coup*

d'état was a direct violation of the assurances which Huerta gave his government.

Second: That unless Huerta, voluntarily and on his own initiative, retires at once from power and abandons every idea of controlling the organization of the government and the conduct of negotiations, the first magistrate will find himself under the necessity of intervening by means of an ultimatum, and if this is not accepted he will be obliged to propose to the congress of his country the adoption of practical measures of a most serious nature.

Third: That the government of the first magistrate sincerely desires to avoid extreme measures, as much for the sake of Mexico as for the sake of peace in America, and is of itself disposed to act reasonably in order not to wound Huerta's sense of dignity, and at the same time to give Huerta the personal protection he might need.

Fourth: That with this purpose in view it proposes the following: that there be selected some person, or small group of persons which to the least possible extent shall have been connected with the recent political disturbances (for example, men of mature age who have retired from the field of politics and who enjoy the confidence of the people), who shall form a constitutional government and make whatever arrangements may be necessary for a general election. In these elections there shall be selected a new congress and a new chief executive, to the end that the government be established on a constitutional basis.

Fifth: That such a course is absolutely necessary to the end that he (the chief executive) merit the approval of the first magistrate, for the reason that the government of the chief magistrate has firmly and irrevocably decided, by one method or another, to eliminate completely all assistance that Huerta believes he may receive from foreign sources, if he persists in his proposal to remain in power, it being a further fact that only for a few days longer will he, Huerta, be free to select the course he chooses to follow. His withdrawal, and consequent absolute liberty of action in the re-establishment of constitutional power, alone will be accepted by the chief magistrate. This government cannot urge with too much insistence, now that the outcome is inevitable, that Huerta reach his decision wisely and at the same time give full consideration to the terrible consequences which will follow his vacillation or refusal.

Sixth: That the proposal to substitute Blanquet, or any other representative of the government of Huerta, or any one connected with his *coup d'état*, will conduce to further irritation on the part of the first magistrate and inevitable and definite rupture. The same result will follow any effort to place in power the candidates chosen at the last election, be it for president or member of congress.

And when the old Indian coolly ignored this demand, you did not shrink from inviting the criticism of your own countrymen by lifting the embargo upon guns which, like those in the Philippines, may at no distant day be turned upon our own soldiers. No, Mr. President, it is not from lack of energy or resolution that your attempt to apply political eugenics to Mexico in a schoolmasterful way has

failed. It is from the fatal defect within the policy itself—the futile threat which, as we declared in November, “instead of eliminating Huerta from power, riveted him in his place, there to remain, in all probability, until he shall be expelled by force of arms.” This judgment, based upon certain logic, has now found general acceptance, and it is to that most important fact, Mr. President, that we would direct your attention.

No writer has made it so clear as you that “the only force” that can control a President in shaping his course with respect to large matters of public policy is “the force of Public Opinion.” But Public Opinion is no less subject to change than individual judgment, and, if it is to be accepted as a true guide, it must be examined and interpreted at frequent intervals. When, in November, we urged upon you manful reversal of a policy which we then believed to be and which has since proved to have been untenable, we did not assume to reflect the common view. We could not but feel that much of the seeming approval was no more than natural and praiseworthy restraint; but there were few evidences to that effect, and you were quite justified in assuming that your attitude had won general commendation. The newspaper Press in particular was notably insistent and steadfast in support of your determination to drive Huerta from his position of authority. But is it so now? Let us mark the indications afforded by our leading journals. We quote:

From the Washington Post:

The people of the United States have, during the past ten months, given to the President and his Secretary of State a most remarkable proof of their confidence in their sincerity of purpose. The more remarkable inasmuch as many of them have failed to see that the rights of our citizens were as fully protected as desired, or that “the watching and waiting” policy was either beneficial to Mexico, to the United States, or fair to the citizens or subjects of foreign nations.

That it has not brought peace or happiness to the people of Mexico must be admitted.

That it has been productive of immense losses to American, British, German, French, and Spanish investors is apparent to all.

That it has advanced the peace interests of the world is exceedingly doubtful.

That it was and is producing friction in our foreign relations would seem to be as clear as diplomatic secrecy will permit the public to judge.

From the New Orleans Picayune:

Strong as has been President’s Wilson’s policy with respect to matters

of domestic concern, it must be admitted with regret that his attitude toward Mexico has been extremely weak and vacillating. Americans have been told to leave the country, as their government either could not or would not protect them. Foreigners, both Americans and Europeans, have been maltreated and their property seized or pillaged, yet nothing has been done other than the presentation of feeble protests.

As a result of this course foreign governments have lost all confidence in our ability to control the Mexican situation, and as they have no reason to expect anything from the revolutionists, they are quietly financing Huerta in the belief that he is the only man in Mexico capable of maintaining at least a show of order.

Whether or not it be a fact that foreign governments are "quietly financing" Huerta, there can be no question that he is well supplied with means.

From the San Francisco *Argonaut*:

That President Wilson still hopes for the establishment of peace and order in Mexico in the spirit of her parchment constitution is simply evidence of the failure of a man of academic mind to distinguish between fact and theory. So long as Mr. Wilson shall maintain his present views, and his present course of action Mexico must suffer under that combination of cruelties and terrors so forcibly described in a letter from the City of Mexico printed in last week's *Argonaut*. One well-intentioned but unfortunately misinformed and curiously stubborn man is practically holding Mexico prostrate to be scorched and flayed. It is truly a terrible responsibility.

These are strong words from a journal accustomed to weigh its utterances; we dislike to print them; but how else can Public Opinion be revealed?

From the Boston *Transcript*:

We have tried "watchful waiting," only to abandon it in favor of the even more mischievous policy of pouring oil on the flames of civil war. Some of the bullets that pierced Benton's body may have been supplied to Villa from this country in consequence of the raising of the embargo on arms. To "watchful waiting" bloody blundering has succeeded.

From the Boston *Herald*:

One way out of this calamitous course remains—with honor. There is still a chance to avert war. It is to recognize Huerta, and further than that to strengthen his hand. We should renew the embargo on arms to the bandits.

It may be that this step would come too late, that our policy has so weakened Huerta that he can no longer restore order. But he deserves the chance. He has clearly established his claim as the *de facto* ruler of Mexico. And until we have given him the opportunity we are not justified in making the sacrifice that armed intervention would entail.

From the Manchester *Union*:

Conditions south of the Rio Grande are certainly no better, and probably much worse to-day than they were at the beginning of the Wilson

Administration—and Heaven knows they were bad enough then. The policy of “watchful waiting” has been, to put it brutally, a policy of idleness.

Huerta, in an interview, declares that the present situation in Mexico is due to the United States; and, in a sense, he is right.

From the *Burlington Free Press*:

Having failed to recognize the established Government in the capital of Mexico, and thus waived the right to hold Huerta's administration responsible for the protection of Americans in all Mexican territory, the Wilson Administration seems to have made the further mistake of recognizing in effect and aiding a rebel leader, in the person of Villa, even more blood-thirsty than Huerta was in connection with the overthrow of Madero.

Here, too, the precedents are strongly against the Wilson Administration, and in view of Mr. Wilson's recent utterances in defense or palliation of Villa, who has killed Americans as well as British, it is not strange that Dr. Moore declined to allow his prestige as an international authority to suffer further from the smashing of precedents.

If President Wilson should undertake to follow the intervention of which he has already been guilty and which was in reality an act of war, by sending a military force into Mexican territory and thus instituting armed intervention, he will find it difficult to vindicate his course in the eyes of the nations as well as of the American people.

From the *Brooklyn Eagle*:

The policy of the administration, so far as it is generally understood, contemplates the scheme of Mexico working out her own destiny as a result of her present internal warfare, so that constitutional government will be restored, at least so far as it ever existed in the republic south of the Rio Grande. Those who adhere to this policy, however, say frankly they see no hope whatever that Mexico, through the agency of Villa, Carranza, Zapata, or any of the other revolutionary and bandit leaders, can restore constitutional government. Many of them admit that Huerta might have done so, with the aid of the United States; or at least might have succeeded in pacifying Mexico, even if he only brought about a restoration of the practical despotism that existed under Porfirio Diaz.

From the *St. Johnsbury Caledonian*, the leading weekly newspaper of Vermont:

Defeated in his whole programme to date, President Wilson should adopt another and recognize the Huerta government in Mexico the same as he recognized the new revolutionary government in Peru. Such a change in tactics may prevent a war with Mexico, and President Wilson, if he desires to save the country from one of its most serious blunders, will make it. The question now is not, is Huerta big enough to control Mexico, but is President Wilson big enough to acknowledge his mistake and save his country from the terrible misfortune it is now facing?

From the *New York Mail*:

While the Wilson Government has recognized the brutal dictatorship of Yuan Shi-Kai in the pretended Chinese Republic, it has refused to recognize the Huerta Government in Mexico, accepted by all other important nations, and has plainly encouraged the murderous and looting

forces of the rebels, led by notorious and savage bandits, in a hopeless and shameful chaos of destruction that means the complete devastation of a rich and neighboring country or American armed intervention.

The dignity and authority of the United States as the protagonist of the American republics has been openly insulted and mocked in Mexico by the grafters of the South and the cutthroats of the North, and our national prestige in Latin America has been seriously damaged.

Meantime the Wilson administration has made the United States responsible for Mexican conditions that must go from bad to worse until, apparently, the horrors and losses must end in bloody intervention.

From the *Sioux City Journal*:

The weak point of the Administration has been found in its foreign policy. The Mexican situation has proved an unworkable puzzle. There is a prevailing impression that President Wilson and Secretary Bryan have not made the most of their opportunities diplomatically.

The great European powers, following precedent which represents demonstrated expediency, promptly recognized the Huerta Government as the *de facto* Government. Mr. Bryan at once took the rôle of a diplomatic white blackbird when he refused to recognize that Government or even to deal in regular form with it. The worst of his demand that General Huerta abdicate was not its grotesqueness. It virtually invited all disaffected rebel and bandit elements in the north and elsewhere to assert themselves. It crippled the central Government by injuring its credit, which was otherwise sufficient to raise ample funds in Europe. When bandit forces, thus encouraged and energized, had coalesced, the removal of the embargo furnished them with arms, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds, for which they were able to raise money by wholesale confiscation and robbery.

But right at this point startling outrages force upon the world's attention the fact that the rebel government, both in its personnel and in its methods of gaining and of using power, is incomparably worse than the worst that has been imputed to the central Government, of which General Huerta is still *de facto* head after a year of rule. Disavowing intervention, we have thus in effect intervened against the actually existent central Government. Thereby we have paralyzed its power and responsibility in northern Mexico, and yet no tolerable governmental power or responsibility has been substituted for it there with which we ourselves and other civilized nations can deal. At the same time neither we ourselves step in nor permit other nations to step in to vindicate foreign rights. Mr. Bryan simply started wrong and has been going wrong.

From the *Louisville Courier-Journal*:

War is what we shall get, sooner or later, for the folly of clinging to the Monroe Doctrine and assuming police supervision of Latin America in behalf of Christendom. President Wilson may succeed in avoiding it this time, but war we shall have sooner or later, in Mexico or elsewhere in Latin America, and the harvest of blood and tears will have been earned by the sowing of folly.

Surely Don Quixote, astride of Rozinante, with the barber's bowl on his head for a helmet, was never a more ridiculous figure than that country cuts at the present juncture.

From the Hartford Courant:

By the simple recognition of the Huerta Government, which under all the rules and practices of intelligent diplomacy is fully entitled to recognition, there would be no need of sending any American army into Mexico. President Wilson is not so stupid as not to see this. President Wilson is a man of acute and most alert intelligence, and he is not above learning by his own blunders, as is shown by his promptness in giving official recognition to the revolutionary governments just set up in Peru and Hayti.

But he is morally obstinate—obstinate by nature and obstinate by years of autocratic rule in the schoolroom; and in addition to this he fears that his prestige, which has been carefully built up all through the country by his unlimited newspaper admirers, would be impaired by the frank confession that his much-vaunted Mexican policy has been one continuous blunder from the outset.

The election of a New Congress in November of this year, a piece of work in which he has already taken the directing hand, also makes it especially inopportune, from his party point of view, to admit a change of mind in regard to our relations with Mexico; yet it is only by such a change of mind and of policy, to which his own nature, habits, and special political interests of the moment are strongly opposed, that he can really and truly do the thing that is required in order to keep our troops out of Mexico.

This is why we say that President Wilson needs to begin all over again in the treatment of Mexico. It has taken him a long time to find out the kind of men with whom he has been sympathizing and upon whom he has been depending for the political regeneration of that country. He violated all the rules and usages governing such matters by undertaking to say for Mexico what kind of a government Mexico should have, and his undertaking has broken down. He can send American troops into Mexico, or he can give due recognition to the existing Huerta government. There are the alternatives. But President Wilson cannot truly be said to be "trying" to avert armed intervention in Mexico unless he first tries the old and reputable and peaceful method of recognizing and giving the moral support of the United States to the *de facto* Government of that country.

From the Chicago Inter-Ocean:

There is no disguising the fact that Mr. Wilson's "watchful waiting" policy has proved a dismal failure. Good intentions remain the only excuse for this refusal to accept accomplished facts when Madero fell.

Mr. Moore wanted Huerta accepted as *de facto* ruler of Mexico not because he approved Huerta, but as the strongest man in sight, and on the ground that the manner in which Mexicans see fit to change their rulers is none of our business. It is, perhaps, still possible to take that course. It is plain that Carranza and Villa will not do. Huerta may be a poor stick from idealistic viewpoints, but what more capable Mexican is in sight?

Mr. Wilson has demanded and has been given a free hand. His dealings with Mexico have brought the country to the point where it may be compelled, against its will, to armed intervention, that it may preserve its self-respect. Has President Wilson the moral courage to change his policy

and bring the nation out of the difficult and dangerous position into which he has led it?

From the *Detroit Free Press*:

The nation stands on the brink of an imbroglio with the whole or a part of Mexico. It is not the doing of the American people. It is the result of a wholly unfeasible policy, persisted in against all logic—a policy which breaks every canon of tried diplomacy and common sense. The nation has not desired war; it does not want it now. If forced into a conflict it will make the fight because it finds itself in a position where no other course is compatible with honor and self-respect and duty to citizens abroad.

Columns of like editorial comment are before our eyes—all of the same tenor. The excerpts presented have been selected from representative journals of various sections, of whose intelligence, patriotism, and sincerity there can be no question. Even the *New York World*, whose faithfulness you surely must appreciate, finds room upon its editorial page for the following communication:

Notwithstanding our strong official opposition to Huerta, that has prevented him from obtaining funds or augmenting his army, and your repeated assertions that he was on his last legs, he seems to have proved that he is the strongest leader in Mexico to-day, and that, had he been granted recognition in April last, his country would have been peaceful long since, at least would have been free from the armed bands of such assassins and robbers as Villa, Castillo, Zapata, and others. I do not mention Carranza, as he is apparently only a figurehead, with sufficient sense to keep him from coming in contact with Villa.

It seems to me plain that those who have advocated recognition for Huerta are not clamorous for war, as you intimate, but firmly believe that such a step would have prevented any cause for intervention by having brought peace to Mexico and saved thousands of lives and millions of dollars' worth of property. Although our official treatment of Huerta has been such as to perfectly warrant him in ignoring completely any demands or requests made to him, he has invariably given courteous attention to all representatives from our unofficial chargé d'affaires and acted promptly on all our complaints.

Kindly note this: If we do not recognize Huerta and assist him in bringing his country out of anarchy (though very late for such a step and now attended with much greater difficulties than at an earlier date), intervention must surely take place, for even should we willingly continue our "watchful waiting" and look on quietly at a terrible state of affairs, other nations will not agree to hold aloof for a much longer period.

And the *New York Times*, speaking from its sense of fairness, says of Huerta that he "has treated foreign residents, including Americans, well; has submitted to peculiar and unprecedented relations with the United States with remarkable self-control; has treated the American President's personal representative, Mr. Lind, with courtesy, while he

has listened with good grace to suggestions made by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, our chargé at the capital, and frequently acted upon them." And adds frankly:

There is no doubt that he has gained a large measure of respect from many persons in this country who profess to believe that he is the only man in sight who can be looked to to restore order.

So, too, the New York *Evening Post* is driven grudgingly to the conclusion that your Mexican policy, "as a whole, and up to the present, cannot be called a success in the sense that it has achieved the result desired"; and the conservative Philadelphia *Public Ledger* says with striking emphasis:

We ought to reverse our action. We ought to redeem our obligation without hesitation or quibble, an obligation which we have assumed, and rightly assumed, but in the fulfilment of which we have been strangely lacking. It makes no difference whether the Administration was right or wrong when its Mexican policy was adopted. The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford to do, and largeness in the circumstances consists in the capacity to adopt a programme *de novo*, to sweep out of the way regard for petty consistency, to acknowledge whatever errors there may have been in former policy, to break the shackles of accepted precedent and move untrammelled toward a complete solution of the problem.

That is the largeness which the nation expects of the President. Public opinion senses the imminent peril of intervention and the necessity for action. It does not presume to dictate what policy the Administration should adopt, although the recommendatory attitude of the Press is almost unanimously in favor of a Pan-American concert, but it does insist that the pilot put his hands to the wheel and give positive direction to a forward movement, that the fine skill which has guided the process of the repeal of the canal-tolls exemption be exercised now in extricating the nation from the lamentable shallowness of purpose into which it has been permitted to drift.

And what says the man in the street? We, better, perhaps, than those who convey only pleasing information, could tell you; but let him speak for himself through the newspapers. We find, as a result of the most cursory examination:

In letters to the New York *Herald*:

When an individual . . . realizes he has made a mistake he will, if he is big, acknowledge and correct it. Should not a nation be as big as an individual?

President Wilson has withheld recognition from the only government that exists in Mexico, believing the forces in opposition would be able to accomplish Huerta's early overthrow, and that in these forces lay Mexico's best hope for peace.

Events have proved the policy of the United States to be wrong. Huerta, whose government is just as constitutional as that of Peru,

which the President hastened to recognize, has lasted for more than a year. The "Constitutionalist" cause has produced nothing better than a Villa.

Hasn't the time come for the President to realize and rectify his mistake, not in the interest of Huerta, but as a right due to the American people? . . .

Recognition of the Huerta government seems to me the only possible way for us to escape the armed intervention that neither the President nor anybody else in this country wants.

There is very much to commend in President Wilson's address to Congress yesterday. Who can question the wisdom of this:

"The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford to do, a voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere questioned."

President Wilson may well ponder these words from his own mouth. They apply directly and forcefully to his own Mexican policy.

If he is able to do the "large thing" and voluntarily withdraw from his mistaken attitude, which is responsible for all our troubles, this nation may yet see a "way out" from its unfortunate Mexican entanglements. I fear there is no such "way out" unless the President does follow the excellent advice he yesterday gave to Congress.

In a letter to the New York *Tribune*:

There seem to be but two alternatives—immediate intervention or immediate recognition of Huerta, far preferably the latter. The world has always recognized that moral courage is far greater than physical courage. Is President Wilson great enough and strong enough to say to Huerta: "I have opposed you from the beginning because I thought I was right and that you were wrong. I now realize that I have been wrong, and I am going to give you a chance to prove that you are right and can bring peace to Mexico. I am therefore willing to recognize your government with the understanding that you will bring peace to your country within the next three months. If you fail to accomplish this I shall recommend immediate intervention to Congress. The present conditions cannot continue; they are intolerable." If Woodrow Wilson is a big enough man to do this our people and the nations of the world will acclaim him the greatest man in the world. I can see no alternative.

In a letter to the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*:

The writer during his vacation in the past summer met some intelligent American people who had large property interests in Mexico, and for his own enlightenment inquired as to their opinion relative to conditions in that country.

They advised him that they thought the only salvation of Mexico could come from within, and that Huerta, backed up by his Government, was the only person qualified to thoroughly police the place.

That the only bar to such action on the part of Huerta was the opposition stand taken by the Government of the United States.

That this Government stood alone among the nations in its Mexican policy.

That recognition by this country of the Federal Government of Mexico would enable the latter to borrow, probably in London, possibly in the

United States, all the funds required to maintain order, and to call a halt to the acts of outrageous brutality now being committed, and to the great loss of property belonging to American and British subjects residing in Mexico.

In letters to the New York *Sun*:

If our President, who has proved himself in some ways in this first year of his incumbency a very great President, could persuade himself that the whole world is not in the wrong—that he is like the Irishman who informed his drill sergeant who told him that he was out of step, not at all, that he was in step, and that all the rest of the company were out of step; if he could be made to believe that he and his friends may possibly be wrong, since the whole world of Europe and America thinks concerning the advisability of Huerta's recognition exactly the reverse of his thinking; if he would come out frankly and answer that upon misinformation furnished him at the outset concerning General Huerta's resources and personality he declined to recognize him, but that now he perceives his mistake and will recognize him—then the President at one bound would become the most popular man in the United States, war would be averted, and the whole problem solved.

It is the belief of those who have studied the situation and are on the ground that Huerta, if as well backed by this country as the so-called Constitutionalists have been, would make good in short order and restore peace and prosperity to distracted Mexico.

It has been said that most of Mexico is against Huerta. This is erroneous. If this were true, when the rebels attack a town they should be able to take it without much trouble, since the inhabitants of same would attack the Federals from the rear. Whenever the rebels, or bandits, assault a town, the inhabitants join in the defence of the town. This is the most eloquent proof that Mexico, as a country, is in favor of President Huerta.

From the foregoing it can be seen that Huerta, far from being a traitor, is a great patriot, that he is the *de facto* and the *de jure* President of Mexico, and that the Mexican people at large support him heartily. The foreign powers, with the exception of this country and maybe one or two of minor importance, recognizing these incontrovertible facts, have recognized Huerta as the *de facto* and the *de jure* provisional President of Mexico. The United States ought to follow suit and vindicate herself by acknowledging her misconception of the facts. This acknowledgment would have no savor of humiliation, for "to err is human" and to make amends is manly and holy. This non-recognition policy on the part of the Wilson Administration on the reported ground that it would be immoral to grant recognition is tantamount to saying that all the other Governments that have recognized Huerta are immoral, which would be a reflection on all the civilized world.

In view of the above, it is to be hoped that the American Government will come to the conclusion which I stated above, namely, that it has misconceived the facts, and that it must vindicate itself by recognizing the Huerta Administration forthwith.

The extraordinary characteristic of this galaxy of edi-

torial and individual pronouncements is its unanimity. There may have appeared somewhere a word of approval of "watchful waiting" since the embargo was lifted, but if so, despite our painstaking reading of many American newspapers, we have not seen it—not one word. Taking into further consideration the rapidly increasing disposition of Senators and Representatives, who are most sensitive to the views of their constituents upon the eve of an election, what are we to infer? In your truly eloquent message to the Congress delivered in person on August 27th, you attributed the Mexican Government's rejection of your proposals to your belief that "the authorities had been grossly misinformed and misled upon two points." First, they did not "realize the spirit" of "friendship" and "determination" of the American people; and, secondly, "they did not believe that the present Administration spoke, through Mr. Lind, for the people of the United States." Consequently, you added in perfectly good faith and we believe with full warrant as of the moment, "so long as the misunderstanding continues we can only await the time of their awakening to a realization of the actual facts." You concluded, if our memory is not at fault, with the comforting assurance that "the steady pressure of moral force will before many days (after August 27th, 1913) break the barriers of pride and prejudice down and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies," etc., etc.

But that is beside the point. The question is, Does the present Administration *now* speak, through Mr. Lind or anybody else, for the people of the United States? In view of the indications of the certain trend, if not indeed the definite formulation of Public Opinion, is there not room for doubt—and occasion for very grave reflection?

You spoke, Mr. President, in your latest Message, of the difficulties which you are now experiencing in dealing with foreign Governments, especially with respect to "matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence" than the canal-tolls dispute, and you pleaded with the Congress to empower you to adopt conciliatory measures. It is clear, therefore, that you attach particular importance to Foreign Public Opinion at this crucial time. What, then, is the consensus of that judgment upon your Mexican policy?

The most consistent friends of America among the public

journals of England are the *London Times* and the *Spectator*. Both have deplored from the beginning your refusal to recognize the *de facto* Government. While hoping for the best, the *Times* still cannot escape the conclusion that you have "assumed responsibilities that may well lead to armed intervention"; and the *Spectator* says:

We can foresee nothing but bitter and cruel mortification as the result of Mr. Wilson's policy of "watchful waiting," while that policy means watching and waiting on such fiendish villainies. So far the effects of Mr. Wilson's policy have been the very nemesis of pacifism. General Huerta, as the *de facto* ruler of Mexico, at least had a better chance than any one else of producing order. But that was not enough for Mr. Wilson. With admirable yet fatal motives, he looked for personal perfection in a land where it does not exist, at all events in public life. By gradual stages he has been driven into a corner, and has at last come to the point of recognizing anarchy in preference to recognizing General Huerta. By a very different route from that of a professed man of iron and blood, he has arrived for all practical purposes at a purely cynical policy. He has removed the prohibition on the traffic in arms across the United States frontier, and now looks on "watchfully" while American citizens and British subjects are killed and trains are sent full tilt into burning tunnels. This terrible state of affairs is the result of the primary error of supposing that you can dictate to a proud and independent country and at the same time really respect its independence. "Things are what they are, and the consequences will be what they will be. Why, then, should we desire to be deceived?" The alternatives are to recognize whatever President has at the moment climbed to power, and to act as though Mexico were no longer an independent country. One or the other it must be. The latter policy has always meant a great campaign and a military occupation, although Mr. Wilson has steadily refused to see what he did not wish to believe.

The conservative *Morning Post* pronounces your position "absolutely unintelligible" and possessing "all the appearance of encouragement to anarchy, civil war, and murder of foreign residents in Mexico." We quote briefly from the leading journals of other countries:

From the *Economiste Française* of Paris:

The United States have as President to-day a doctrinaire, very eager for the people's good. Mr. Woodrow Wilson is a university professor and the author of some interesting books. He consequently has the advantages and disadvantages pertaining to a life long devoted to learning and teaching. His mentality is elevated, but rigidly unadaptive; his honesty is above suspicion. He is, however, deficient in experience. He considers himself called upon to regenerate the public morals not only of the United States, but also of other countries. He says he will not permit Mexico to initiate such and such a governmental solution of the deadlock or put forward such and such a candidate for the presidency. But neither Mexico nor the nations of Europe can possibly submit to these

North American injunctions. Mexico is an independent state, and it is desirable she should remain so.

From the *Novoye Vremya* of St. Petersburg:

The fact that all European, South American, and Asiatic countries have long recognized the Government of Huerta can be considered as the best proof that Huerta has ably conducted the governmental affairs of Mexico. Only the United States has assumed a peculiar position. While refusing to recognize Huerta, it has until now confined itself to the energetic support of the rebels concentrated in the north with money, men, and ammunition. The Message of President Wilson reveals the game of the United States. It not only demands that an armistice should be concluded with the revolutionists, but even insists categorically that Huerta should not be a candidate for President in the coming election. It is not in vain that the Western European press permitted themselves to express the supposition that the United States openly take the side of Mexican anarchy.

From the *Berliner Tageblatt*:

Every Mexican knows very well that the policy of the United States in regard to Mexican affairs aims at establishing a protectorate, more or less disguised, over their Republic, because it separates the United States from the partially subjugated republics situated north of Panama. Huerta is not a particularly attractive individual, but it is nevertheless true that this "immoral" man against whom the ex-professor of Princeton contemplates the mobilization of an army is exactly the man that Mexico at this juncture needs. He would have established the order which has so long been disturbed if he had been permitted to do so. The dictator is fully aware of the peril to which he and his country are exposed from the United States. He has merely persistently faced this peril without paying any attention to the clamor that rises on the other side of the Rio Grande. That he has so far succeeded in his plans to a certain point is proved by the check administered to the tragi-comic mission of Lind. . . . At present the submission of Huerta is a thing inconceivable. It appears more probable that he will let Uncle Sam bite the sour fruit of failure.

From the *Boersen Courier* of Berlin:

The sly and undecided policy of the United States has made American diplomacy the laughing-stock of the world. The Government at Washington is aiming in an underhand way at stripping Mexico of her political independence, but above all at establishing in that country the economic supremacy of the United States. If that Government had desired nothing more than the re-establishment of peace it would have recognized Huerta long ago.

From the *Imparcial* of Madrid:

We have every reason for deeply distrusting the United States. We have already frequently pointed out how the Northern Republic is attempting to take Mexico in her net.

Is it not now quite clear, Mr. President, that your attitude toward Mexico is "a position questioned and misunderstood" in Europe?

In your speech at Mobile you emphasized our friendliness for the South American republics. "We must prove ourselves," you declared, "their friends and champions, upon terms of equality and honor. We must show ourselves their friends by comprehending their interest, whether it squares with our interest or not." What has been the effect upon these republics of your Mexican policy? What signified the "Vivas Huerta" with which Mr. Roosevelt was greeted in Chile? What says the Press of South America? We quote:

From the powerful *Prensa* of Buenos Ayres:

All that Wilson has said in his address to the Congress at Washington has merely served to fortify the position taken by Huerta. The policy of Mr. Wilson has only one tendency, and that is to unite the Latin-American states, in spite of Uncle Sam, and make such a hostile federation a reality instead of the political dream which it has hitherto been.

From the *Voz de Oriente* of Lima:

Far from mending, the situation in Mexico is growing more complicated and dangerous. This condition of things results in a large measure from the attitude of the Government at Washington in refusing to recognize Huerta, while Wilson sympathizes with the rebels and even gives them his support. This is the cause of the movement among the students in Mexico City. These youngsters have made a grand manifestation against the Yankees before the palace of the Governor when they carried flags bearing the inscription "Death to the Yankees!" The irritation exhibited by the Mexicans is amply justified.

From the *Prensa* of Lima:

The President's declaration that he could not recognize Huerta's Government because it was founded upon treason is extremely interesting. But nothing can justify the intervention of one state in the affairs of another. At least there ought to be some explanation of the motive which urges North America to favor, by opposing Huerta, the interests of Carranza's insurgents who have raised the ensign of an independent Mexico.

From the *Revista de Yucatan* of Merida:

President Wilson and his Secretary of State appear each to be one of three things. Either they are the romanticists of diplomacy, or the ignoramuses of diplomacy, or the hypocrites of diplomacy. In whichever of these characters we regard them, they are hurtful to the country they govern and to the nations with which they deal. For nothing can be more pernicious in political life than romanticism which engenders your dreamers, your fanatics, extravagant theorists, and your Utopians who do not see the reality of things, who do not perceive the world in which they live and attempt to go beyond the law of nature. The ignoramus is one destitute of science or letters. . . . The hypocrite is just what the word imports—he is a man who blazons abroad as his own the virtues he does not possess.

From *El Imparcial* (anti-Huerta) of Mexico:

It is difficult to believe that the Yankee Government is authorizing the sale of arms to the bandits of Villa, who pillage, burn, and murder

throughout the country. How can the rulers of a cultivated people, under guidance of a wilful and obstinate leader, suffer themselves to be guilty of complicity with such a band of plunderers? It once appeared impossible that President Wilson should be a man destitute alike of conscience and a sense of shame. If the American people approve of this astounding measure taken by their President, they will deserve the contempt of all honorable nations.

From the *Pais* (pro-Huerta) of Mexico:

The only thing which President Wilson will have done is to bring into greater prominence the personality of Huerta, who, thanks to the intrigues of the North Americans, represents to-day upon our new continent the soul of the Latin race.

Can there be any doubt, Mr. President, that your course has served only to intensify the distrust and dislike of the very peoples whose good-will you courted and whose "friend and champion" you sincerely wish to become? Is not here again, where least of all we desire it, questioning and misunderstanding?

It is not necessary to point the direction of the sympathies of Japan, with whom we would maintain amicable relations; it is not necessary to record the unanimous judgment of all foreign residents of Mexico nor to recount the prayers of our own countrymen who feel that they have been abandoned; these are only too unhappily familiar.

What to do? Why, Mr. President, there is but one thing to do. There never has been but one thing to do. That is to put under your feet the solid precedent that was established by this Nation at the beginning of its career and that has been heeded by all other Powers in this particular instance: Extend to the *de facto* government of Mexico official recognition. We pass no criticism upon your refusal to take this logical and sensible action originally. You erred, of course, as all the world now concludes, and as you yourself confessed when you acknowledged the validity of the "usurping" Governments of Peru and Hayti; but it was an excusable, possibly even a justifiable, error because it sprang from the best of intentions. What we do ask is that you do not persist in a course which leads straightway to the undoing of all your good works, through the certain defeat of your party and the execration that just as surely will be visited upon yourself if, as a consequence of sheer obduracy, this country shall be dragged into a hateful war. It may or may not be a correct assumption that Huerta, unhampered, could have pacified his country, but there is

and can be absolutely no question that you deprived him of the means of effective striving.

Grant that Huerta is a bad man. Is he not, nevertheless, the best? Has he not proved himself, in contrast with Villa, Carranza, and Zapata? Surely in recent years no ruler's ability has been put so severely to test. Consider what he has done single-handed and alone! Confronted at the outset by a hostile Congress such as he well knew had achieved the downfall of Madero, surrounded by a Cabinet of intriguers, refused recognition by the United States, branded rightfully or wrongfully, but without adduced evidence, as an accessory to assassination, deprived of the opportunity to borrow moneys through the desire of foreign Governments to curry favor with the nation which is now more commonly than before referred to throughout Latin America as "the big bully," cajoled, threatened, cut off from aid wherever possible, while simultaneously the hordes of opposing bandits and desperadoes were being supplied, furtively at first and then openly, with arms and ammunition, and now—at the end of thirteen months—he is conceded to be more strongly intrenched than ever! It is an amazing personal record, Mr. President, worthy surely of admiration, and remarkable especially for the consistent dignity, courtesy, and consideration exhibited by the old Indian himself in his dealings with an Administration which has been—shall we frankly admit?—not invariably tactful and perhaps upon occasion slightly dictatorial.

It is *not* too late. It is *never* too late to do the right thing. Moreover, the change in conditions affords you full warrant for reversing your position. While you had faith in the sincerity and high purpose of the rebel leaders, there appeared at least a semblance of reason for taking their part, but now that they have dropped the mask and stand revealed in their true light as murdering marauders, their last claim upon your consideration has disappeared. You gave them their chance, at great risk to your own reputation, when you opened the doors for the delivery of arms, and they have shown their appreciation by ignoring your wishes, flouting your authority, and making you appear before the world as a virtual ally of a dastardly bandit. While Huerta has been earning your respect, Villa has been abusing your confidence. Clearly, the withdrawal of aid from the rebels now would be regarded everywhere not only as

fully justified, but as a fitting response to the demands of humanity and civilization.

But what, you may ask, is to be gained by recognizing Huerta at this late day? And we answer, everything! He may not be able under any circumstances to pacify Mexico, but all there whose lives and properties are at stake agree that he is, rightfully or wrongfully, Mexico's only hope. He is ours, too, and yours, because he has come to be the only force capable of maintaining order and so possibly of averting the dreaded intervention which continuance of the existing chaos is certain in time to produce. Practicability, no less than theory and tradition, calls for upholding of the *de facto* government.

There are other reasons, Mr. President, more personal to yourself. You have no base now from which to act; no avenue through which to communicate; no way of meeting the just demands of foreign Powers except, as in the case of England, by proffering special favors. And you are under suspicion. The mere fact that your policy is "unintelligible" has given rise to a growing conviction, especially in South America, as evidenced above, that it is insincere and is deliberately designed to engender war and conquest. You no longer have at your back the mighty force of Public Opinion, as we have shown. Abroad, as you must realize, the common attitude toward your watchful waiting is quite frankly contemptuous; at home, it is one of grave doubt and grave anxiety. To speak plainly, Mr. President, the feeling is growing stronger daily that your persistence in a course, which in common with everybody else you must know to be wrong, is attributable to no kind of reasoning whatsoever, but to your own stubborn pride. For your own sake, then, if for no other cause, it is of the utmost importance that, if there must be war, it shall come as an inevitable consequence, as demonstrably unpreventable by any conceivable means and in strict conformity with the customs and precedents fixed by international usage.

Is it not clear, Mr. President, that this condition can never be realized until the only government, however discreditable, that does exist and the only really strong man, however disreputable, who has appeared, shall have been accorded the full opportunity which so many believe they could utilize even now with ultimate effectiveness? It is the only way, sir, the only way out, the only way to save

Mexico, to save your party, and to save yourself. It is, too, "the large thing to do," the "only thing" you "can afford to do" to escape from a position "everywhere questioned and misunderstood."

We implore you, Mr. President, to take to heart your own splendid words—" *We ought to reverse our action without raising the question whether we were right or wrong* "—and then *do it* "without quibble or hesitation" and win for your country just honor and for yourself the fine renown which the world invariably accords a noble act nobly done.

A PAGE OF DIPLOMACY

"What do you know about this business?" the King said to Alice.

"Nothing," said Alice.

"Nothing *whatever?*" persisted the King.

"Nothing whatever."

"That's very important," the King said, turning to the jury. They were just beginning to write this down on their slates, when the White Rabbit interrupted: "*Unimportant*, your Majesty means, of course," he said in a very respectful tone, but frowning and making faces at him as he spoke.

"*Unimportant*, of course, I meant," the King hastily said, and went on to himself in an undertone, "Important—unimportant—unimportant—important—" as if he were trying which word sounded best.

Some of the jury wrote it down "important," and some "unimportant." Alice could see this, as she was near enough to look over their slates; "but it doesn't matter a bit," she thought to herself.

So mused Ambassador (W. H.) Page on the foggy morning after his famous speech: "A joke—not a joke—not a joke—a joke"; and some of the ninety millions of his countrymen who were serving on the jury wrote it down "a joke" and some "no joke." For ourselves, we think as Alice thought: "It doesn't matter a bit." To the best of our information, Mr. Page holds no commission from the United States of America to define the Monroe Doctrine either as a principle or as a pleasantry.

All of the accounts agree that at first the Ambassador brushed aside reports of dissatisfaction at home as of no consequence because his talk had been the merest banter. "It was meant, Mr. Page says, to be humorous, but," adds the *Sun's* despatch, "neither his hearers nor the readers of the speech seemed to see the joke." Accordingly, on the following day, the Ambassador politely accepted the English view, and authorized the correspondents of the *Times*

and the *Tribune* to say that he "had a deep purpose in mind and a most serious one, namely, to clear up the misapprehensions which have been wide-spread in financial circles here ever since President Wilson's speech (at Mobile) last autumn." Even granting the questionable necessity of interpreting the President, the unwisdom of attempting to elucidate his studied utterance extemporaneously over English walnuts and French wines seems apparent; and yet, since that was the Ambassador's deep purpose according to the latest bulletin, it becomes a matter of passing interest to note what he really said. The *American* claims to have obtained a verbatim report from the official stenographer of the London Chamber of Commerce, reading, "after a few purely introductory remarks," as follows:

I heartily enter into your applause of what several gentleman said, notably the Prime Minister, when he spoke of your concern for the men that work with you and work under you and for your ready applause for plans to train those whose misfortunes make them a burden upon the State.

That strikes a sympathetic note also in our great commercial interests and aims in the United States.

I will not say that we have constructed the Panama Canal for you [laughter], for I am speaking with great frankness and not with what is sometimes called diplomatic indirection [laughter], but I will say most truly that it adds greatly to the pleasure of building that great work that it is you who will most profit by it. [Applause.]

I can say a similar thing about the recent lowering of our tariff. We did not lower it in order to please you [laughter]; it was for purposes that we considered economically sound for ourselves. [Cheers.] Nevertheless, it added to the pleasure of doing that to reflect that thereby we should receive more trade from you. [Cheers.]

Concerning the recent message of the President, I can say somewhat more—I take it upon myself, on my own responsibility, to say more. He told you that not merely to please you, but to express the true sentiment and the self-respect of the American nation, of every true American. [Cheers.]

His was the voice of the people. Nevertheless, it adds to the pleasure of hearing that voice to know that it does please you.

May I put in another parenthesis, also on my own account, and correct an impression that a part of your press seems to have about the attitude of the United States Government concerning the investment of your colossal earnings in States of Central America that have volcanic tendencies? [Laughter.]

I sometimes read that the United States is entering upon a policy to discourage foreign investments. That is untrue. I think that some events are happening there which discourage them somewhat, but I hope that they will not be charged to the United States.

There is a policy forming in the minds of our Government and of our people, which is not new, that would discourage such investments or such concessions as would carry with them the control of the government of

any of those States, and only that [Hear, hear], only that, if you please, for so far as the United States is concerned you know how heartily we have welcomed your investments there, and still welcome them, and always will.

You may be assured that it is not the business of the United States to put any let or hindrance upon any investments of yours anywhere in the world, and it will most heartily welcome your investments in any part of America, provided only you do not make them so that you may take the country with them. [Laughter.]

The Monroe Doctrine, you know, meant only this: That the United States would prefer that no European Government should gain more land in the New World. [Applause.]

For reasons set forth above, as suggested by Alice, the views expressed by Mr. Page hardly call for serious consideration. It may be said, however, that no just exception can be taken to his remark about our recent tariff legislation. Undoubtedly our purpose was economic and selfish and necessarily involved an increase of trading with our best customer. It is, too, an obvious fact that England, having by far the largest mercantile marine, will profit most at first from the building of the Panama Canal, but whether the satisfaction of the American people is so greatly enhanced by the reflection is perhaps a question. We suspect that on the whole they would be better pleased if the greatest benefit should accrue to American shipping. That, we think, in view of our enormous expenditure, is but natural and proper.

If Mr. Page really said that the Monroe Doctrine means "only this: that the United States *would prefer* that no European Government should gain more land in the new world," we can only conclude that he chose words which better exemplified his courtesy and consideration than the actual fact. Clearly, to have declared that the United States *would not permit* European encroachment upon American territory would have seemed unnecessarily brusque and uncalled for. The real doubt is as to the necessity or advisability of trying to define the Monroe Doctrine at all.

With Mr. Page's elucidation of Mr. Wilson's utterance at Mobile regarding foreign investments in South America we have no concern. That is a matter which lies between the President and his Ambassador. The really important point is that Mr. Page was speaking "on my own responsibility," "on my own account," thus depriving his interpretation of both authoritativeness and substantial value. We

have yet to be convinced that President Wilson is incapable of clarifying any dictum of his own which may seem to require explication.

It may not be amiss, finally, to remind Mr. Page, in all friendliness, that it does not lie within his province or power to make a public statement of American policy on his own responsibility. To realize this, he has but to reflect for an instant upon the likelihood of his being seated at a great banquet-table next to the Prime Minister of England at all if he were a private citizen. It seems strange and is a pity that it should have required this somewhat distressing experience to impress upon his understanding the fact which we trust he now fully comprehends, that every word he utters in public he speaks as Ambassador of the United States, and is so accepted quite as definitely by Americans as by the English.

We would not attach undue importance to this particular incident; indeed, barring the placing of a potent weapon in the hands of those who are striving to defeat the President in his splendid endeavor to maintain the Nation's honor, we see little real harm done; and yet who, at a time so critical as this both at home and abroad, can foresee the consequences of such indiscretions?

Referring to *Sieur de Langley's* account of the Ambassador who in a speech "had mixed several tart and injurious expressions to the dishonor of our nation," *Montaigne* remarked:

At which I could not but wonder that it should be in the power of an Ambassador to dispense with anything which he ought to signify to his master especially of so great importance as this, coming from the mouth of such a person, and spoken in so great an assembly. . . . It should seem, methinks, rather to belong to him who is to give the law, than to him who is only to receive it; to him who is in supreme command, and best can judge of his own interests, and not to him who ought to look upon himself as inferior, not only in authority, but in *prudence and good counsel*.

It would be well if all of our not wholly sophisticated Diplomats of Democracy would take to heart this wise admonition of the great philosopher.

TENNIEL AND "PUNCH"

The news of Sir John Tenniel's death a few weeks ago sent the memory flying back to an evening in June, 1901.

The occasion was Tenniel's retirement from the staff of *Punch* after fifty years of incomparable service. The American Ambassador, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the Royal Academy, the leading lawyers, politicians, artists, journalists, actors, and authors of the country, to the number of well over two hundred, came together to give him a farewell dinner. It is doubtful whether such a company ever before assembled to do honor to a political cartoonist or ever will again. It was, of course, much more for his work on *Punch* than even for his masterly illustrations to *Alice in Wonderland* and *Alice Through the Looking-Glass* that Tenniel was acclaimed. For thirty-six years hardly an issue of *Punch* had appeared in which Tenniel's familiar signature was not to be found at the left-hand corner of the cartoon of the week. That was an immense record of hard work, if of nothing else. In Sir John Tenniel's case it was also a record of good work.

There are in New York alone several cartoonists who constantly reach a higher point in humor, power, and draftsmanship than Tenniel ever attained. But looking over the seventy-two half-yearly volumes that contain Tenniel's work, one finds that his standard, if he rarely rose above it and sometimes fell almost calamitously below it, was of a high character and wonderfully maintained. He had his obvious, his unmistakable faults; his composition was not infrequently poor; his style, somewhat statuesque at the best, was on occasion nothing less than wooden; and there were men, like Mr. Balfour and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, whose features he never could catch. His humor, like his pathos and his meaning, was large and unshaded. His whole case was got up in good plain black and white. So much was evident on the surface, and on the casual, and especially the American, reader of *Punch*, might have acted merely as a deterrent. But to the student—and every one who wants to understand England should be a student of *Punch*—Tenniel's work took on a charm that even its manifest defects could not destroy. It was, for one thing, always pointed and apt. Sir John always contrived to produce something that hit the nail precisely on the head and gave expression to what the average Englishman was thinking at the moment. Also it was work of unfailing dignity. Tenniel, as Mr. Balfour said at that farewell banquet, was "a great artist and a great gentleman." He hit hard, but never malignantly,

and he never overstepped the line that separates caricature from travesty. Rancor was just as absent from his cartoons as indecisiveness. What he had to say he said boldly and clearly, but with a scrupulous regard for the decencies of combat. He took hold of what sixty-odd years ago was a coarse and scurrilous department both of art and politics, and by his personality and intelligence even more than by his technical skill, he cleansed it, elevated it, revolutionized it, until he made the political cartoon in *Punch* a regular and potent factor in the formation of British opinion.

We have had, and we still have, in America our great cartoonists, but we have not yet succeeded in providing the sort of canvas for them that Tenniel found to his hand in *Punch*. We have never, that is, produced a journal that harmonizes so entirely with the national taste and temperament of America as *Punch* harmonizes with England. From the middle classes up to the summit of the social mountain every one in England reads *Punch*. Its perusal on Wednesday is as much a part of the discipline of English life as church-going. It has a place in every well-organized system of domestic education in the country. From its pages juvenile patriots glean the history of latter-day England, much as Marlborough confessed that he owed what little knowledge of the past he had to Shakespeare. And the *Punch* habit lasts. An Englishman going on a railway journey instinctively buys *Punch* at the bookstall for his traveling companion. The greatest club nuisance in the United Kingdom in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen is the man who goes to sleep clutching the latest issue of *Punch*. A septuagenarian wishing to refresh some early memories turns at once to *Punch*. You will hear *Punch* quoted as an authority on manners and fashions. There may even be corners of England where it serves in some sort the purpose of an illustrated guide to London social life. It is a national institution in far more senses than is the *Times* or any other British journal. And it is so very largely because it has never gone in for extremes. It has always preserved and enforced that common-sense view of public events which partisanship distorts. It is what Lord Rosebery would be if he were a weekly illustrated paper.

Punch has opinions and even a policy, but while it never hides them, it never antagonizes by pressing them too heatedly. Ruskin long ago declared that of all the papers in

England, *Punch* best represented the average opinion of the country. It does so still, and it is just because it does so that it possesses a real historical value. Turn over the back numbers of *Punch* and look at the weekly cartoon and you will have a picture of the sane second thoughts of the nation on the leading event of the day. It is a calm, good-humored, pointed, pictorial summary of British, and occasionally of world, history. Then, again, besides its sense of balance, *Punch* is absolutely wholesome; and in a paper of its kind that is a quality which atones for much. Pick up a single issue of a French or a German or an American humorous journal and a single issue of *Punch*, and you will probably prefer the former—it will at least make you laugh. But compare half a dozen issues and you will find inclination veering toward *Punch*. And when it comes to whole volumes, inclination, in ninety-seven cases out of a hundred, will be definitely fixed on the side of the English periodical, after all.

Punch and *Life* are the two professedly humorous journals in the world, the bound volumes of which can be looked into not only without weariness and nausea, but with positive pleasure. To say that is to say a good deal. The great fault of the American comic papers is that they are not serious enough. They are always making jokes. You laugh yourself into a fit of profound depression while reading them. They are too much in the air, too trivial, too grotesque, too local, and they rarely know when to leave off. *Punch* evades these mistakes because it is at least as much a critical as a humorous journal, and its criticism is the easy, arm-chair, equable criticism of a man of the world on human nature and the politics, fashions, fads, and incidents of the day. The American comic paper is like the professional funny man at a party. You listen and laugh for a while and then you want to murder him. The man you are content to sit at the feet of for hours at a stretch is that quiet, shrewd-looking, middle-aged, but vital gentleman with the grayish hair, who has a little scholarship, a little wit, plenty of common-sense and experience, who never cuts capers or tries to force the pace, but keeps you placidly chuckling as he holds forth—in other words, *Punch*.

COMMENT

The *Houston Post* quite properly remarks:

In his reference to the President's appointment of a Minister to Colombia, after specifying the qualifications of retiring Minister DuBois, Colonel Harvey observes: "His successor is Mr. Thomas T. Austen, a ranch-owner, of Austin, Texas, presumptively not unknown to Assistant-President Edward M. House." Those who are conversant with the facts are aware that the appointee of President Wilson as Minister to Colombia is Colonel Thaddeus A. Thompson, of Austin. Likewise, after referring to the merits of the retiring Minister to Guatemala, Mr. Robert S. R. Hitt, Colonel Harvey says: "His successor is Rev. William H. Lovell, of Austin, Texas, a Baptist minister aged sixty-three." Rev. William Hayne Leavell is a Presbyterian minister, a resident of the State of Mississippi, and never resided in Austin in his life.

We have no doubt that the *Houston Post*, which is sufficiently near to have access to the Family Bibles of the two Ministers, speaks with knowledge. Our excuse must be that, for some inexplicable reason, neither of the diplomats is mentioned in *Who's Who in America*, and we placed reliance upon current Washington correspondence. But we would not haggle; we apologize to both Colonel Thaddeus A. Thompson, of Austin, and the Reverend William Hayne Leavell, Presbyterian instead of Baptist (though we still have our doubts as to that) and resident of the State of Mississippi, and we cheerfully concede the probability that they will render equally efficient service under their real names.

Simultaneously it is but just that we should record the following facts set forth by an acquaintance of Mr. John B. Jackson, who was deposed from the Ministry at Rumania to make room for Mr. Charles J. Vopicka, formerly of Dolni Hbitz and recently of Chicago:

Mr. Jackson was appointed Second Secretary of Legation at Berlin in 1890, not 1900, was promoted to be Secretary of Embassy by President Cleveland in 1894, and remained in Berlin until 1902, when President Roosevelt appointed him Minister to Greece, Rumania, and Servia, Bulgaria and Montenegro being added to his mission subsequently. In 1907 he was sent to Persia, in 1909 to Havana, and in 1911 back again to Rumania, Servia, and Bulgaria. At the time of his retirement, last October, he was the only American diplomatist who had been in continuous service since 1890. Before that he had been in the Navy—from 1879 to 1886.

The letter concludes:

You will note, therefore, that practically the whole of Mr. Jackson's life

has been spent in the service of his country, as he has never had outside interests of any kind. The peculiar experience which he has acquired has no value for him naturally, and he is obliged to begin life anew. Cannot you offer some suggestion of benefit to those who, like Mr. Jackson, have surely some moral claim upon the consideration of the country which they have served faithfully to the entire satisfaction of successive administrations?

And we have to reply that we cannot.

The Colonel progresses steadily. There now seems to be little doubt that he demanded and obtained a fee of £400 for his speech to the Museo Social of Rio de Janeiro. The trustworthy *Edinburgh Review* confirms the story to that effect told recently by a Chicago merchant upon his return from Brazil.

In the course of an article on "The New Monroeism," the writer alludes to the lecture, and then says: "The Brazilian press seems to have been less impressed with the magnificence of the prospect thus opened up for the Latin-American countries than with the 'Yankee utilitarianism' which led an ex-President of the United States to demand a fee of £400 for the lecture in which he proclaimed the gospel of 'American Internationalism.'" The article goes on to speak of "the caustic comment of the eminent Brazilian scholar, Senhor Oliveira Lima, on these criticisms." Senhor Lima, after pointing out that the Brazilians had already spent some £12,000 for flowers of rhetoric from illustrious European lecturers, asks why they should reserve their censures for Mr. Roosevelt, "who for £400 has sung the beauties of American internationalism, and has gratified our vanity by promising eventually to intrust us with the big stick." Apparently there was occasion for this sharp rebuke, since the Chicago merchant reported that "the Brazilians politely paid the bill, but could not conceal their amazement," while the American residents were "deeply humiliated." Mr. Lawrence F. Abbott, President of the *Outlook* Company, on the other hand, is highly indignant at the suggestion that his distinguished associate violated the proprieties, and, while tacitly admitting the payment, insists that it was not a "fee," but "an honorarium," offered before Mr. Roosevelt left this country "without any suggestion or expectation on Mr. Roosevelt's part." In view of this circumstance, we perceive no cause for carping.

The laborer is not only worthy of his hire, but is entitled to get it; and the directors might have forgotten to send the check if they had not received the bill. We heartily indorse Mr. Lawrence Abbott's sense of the fitness of things. But there is another phase of the incident which grieves us sorely. The Colonel ought not to have been so inconsiderate as to rob Mr. Bryan of his last remaining principle; that, as between friends and fellow-workers of, for, and by the people, was an unfraternal act.

We agree with the *World* that the country suffers little loss from the dissolution of the United States Express Company; it was a very badly managed concern. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the other express companies, however well conducted, can escape for long a like fate, as against Government competition. As the matter now stands, the companies are obliged to pay immense sums to the railroads for transportation, while the Post-Office Department pays absolutely nothing for the carrying of the six hundred million parcels which it estimates it will handle next year. True, the Postmaster-General said in his annual report that in view of the prospective "prodigious growth" of the parcels post, "the railroads, of course, will become entitled to additional compensation for this extra service imposed upon them, and the Department is engaged in gathering all statistical data necessary for ascertaining a correct basis for fixing a just, fair, and adequate compensation for the service rendered," and recommended that "on account of the increased weight of mails" due to the parcels post, he should be authorized to add to the compensation of the railroads not more than one-half of one per cent.; but the amount involved—about \$250,000—was so trifling that neither the Congress nor the railway companies paid any attention to it. The consequence, of course, is that Mr. Burleson is making a "huge success" out of the parcels post and a great personal reputation wholly at the expense of the railroads. It may be that the railways can struggle along without the thirty-odd millions which they would receive on the English basis of division of costs, but how the express companies can long survive such competition is not easy to imagine. It is virtual confiscation, of course, but—well, what of it in these piping days?

From a Washington despatch to the *Sun*:

Great interest was aroused here to-day when despatches from Mexico City announced that the Huerta Government had been included among the Governments to which the United States had sent a circular note in regard to arrangements for the proposed third Hague conference. At the White House it was said that if the Huerta Government had received a copy of the circular note it was through a mistake, and it was clearly indicated that the President still maintains that there is no Government in Mexico City to which such a communication could properly be sent by the United States.

Foreign diplomats here smiled behind their hands to-day when it became known that Huerta had promptly seized the opportunity again to turn the tables on Washington and had solemnly announced his acceptance of the State Department's proposal. Apparently the State Department will now be in the position of being obliged to refuse to accept the acceptance.

So it appears that accidents will happen in the worst regulated State Departments; but Mr. Bryan can hardly be made the scapegoat for this one; he was away. The real pity is that the sending of the note to the Mexican Government was "a mistake."

"The annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury breathes throughout the spirit of optimism, altruism, and psychology," was the *World's* comment in December. "His optimism enables him to figure out a revenue surplus for the next fiscal year of \$26,000,000." The cheery prediction was worthy of a Redfield. The facts are that (1) the February customs collections were \$10,000,000 less than in 1913, and the deficit was nearly \$12,000,000, and (2) the fiscal-year deficit (with four months to come) was \$51,000,000 as against \$19,000,000 a year ago.

Man, like Truth, though crushed to earth, shall rise again. Kindly peruse this, O suffragettes, from Treasury Department regulations regarding income returns:

The husband, as the head and legal representative of the household and general custodian of its income, should make and render the return of the aggregate income of himself and wife, and for the purpose of levying the income tax it is assumed that he can ascertain the total amount of said income.

Can it be possible that Mr. McAdoo had his eye upon cer-

tain possibilities when thus he officially restored to "the husband" his medieval status as "lord and master"?

It is not unusual to hear of an ex-Governor of Oklahoma being a candidate for convict, but there is novelty in an ex-convict being a candidate for Governor; yet such is the case of Mr. Albert J. Jennings, whose platform consists of a firm declaration that "the law shall be no respecter of persons." It is sound doctrine, but in the circumstances "continue to be" would savor more delicately of aptness.

It must surprise George Harvey exceedingly that the President has evinced no disposition to dismiss his Cabinet and subscribe to THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.—*Columbia State.*

Our contemporary forgets that a Cabinet can be had for less than four dollars a year, and yet we are not prepared to say that THE REVIEW would not be worth the difference, as our Southern neighbor seems to intimate.

PAGE BLAMES LONDON PAPERS—SPEECH CONDENSED TOO MUCH, AMBASSADOR DECLARES.—*Newspaper headline.*

Too much? Impossible!

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS THINK CARRANZA'S ATTITUDE MARKS RECESSION.—*Newspaper headline.*

"State Department Officials"? Who are they?

The only really industrious "I. W. W." occupies the White House.

The Colonel will soon be home again!